Campaign for All Singaporean SAF, Police Force

There are 2000 armed Gurkhas in Singapore and their number grows annually by 140.

This is a dangerous sign.

Gurkhas are not Singaporeans. They are mercenaries. AND Mercenaries work for money.

In other words, Gurkhas can be bought with money. Loyalty is a tricky issue here, for their loyalty is dependent on their having to be satisfied with material reward. AND NOW this has proven to be true with their recent rioting incident in Mount Vernon Camp over pay issues which is very worrying.

I do not know how the trouble makers will be taken to task in this incident and whether or not there will be a coverup because of the way in which the MHA has conducted itself with the lack of transparency in the way it fumbled over the Mas Selamat Kastari escape.

The latest Gurkha rioting incident raises many questions in the minds of Singapore Citizens as to: How this mercenary unit being brought in and being armed? How is this mercenary unit empowered to act in Singapore? How is this mercenary unit subject to law and discipline and control?

Will the rioters be charged and disciplined accordingly? What sort of discipline will they receive?

As seen from the Mas Selamat Kastari escape, our administration will bend over backwards for these foreign mercenaries. The Gurkhas on duty ought to have been charged under the Penal Code but instead they were let off with a slap on their wrists. I believe the negligent Singaporean ISD officers received far heavier sanction compared to the negligent Gurkhas. It is amazing how much better treatment these foreigners are being treated in comparison to their Singaporean counterparts in the Police.

[By the way when Singaporean boys have petty fight in groups, they are often charged with rioting and they go to jail for it, I wonder if our Singapore Police Force is held to any higher standards of conduct]

We can trust that the Singapore Police Force and the Ministry of Home Affairs will do their best to cover up this incident and sweep it under the carpet. As if underneath the carpet is already not dirty enough. I would caution against condoning such coverup and I would also caution against the Singaporean public to be complacent enough to overlook the need to pressure the MHA into revealing the worms in the innards of the Gurkha Contingent.

This is because it is my view that the continued presence of Gurkhas in Singapore is the greatest danger to Singapore itself. My reasons are stated below.

If the PAP administration persists on being unrepentant on their mercenary ways and insist on using mercenaries for their security or should i say “the security of Singapore”, it would not be difficult to imagine the possibility of such attitudes infecting the Gurkha Contingent [which is mercenary in the first place] and resulting in the Gurkha Contingent selling out Singapore in time to come.

Imagine, there are 2000 mercenaries armed and ready. Their allegiance unknown. It is easy for them to even try to eliminate the entire leadership and neutralize the other Singaporean units in the Singapore Police Force should they ever decide to do so. And it would be easy for them to do so because the PAP trusts the Gurkhas more than they trust Singaporean Police Officers, they get the Gurkhas to guard Ministers homes.

Furthermore, the Gurkhas are professional soldiers and mercenaries, they are put constantly under training during their service. They upon completion of their vocational training continue to serve their careers in the position they have been trained for.

Singaporean National Servicemen on the other hand are under training only whilst doing their national service and they only turn operational near to their Run-Out-Date (Operationally ready date) only to be released and returned to their civilian status.

In the Singapore Armed Forces, we all know that in each SAF camp, there are roughly only 10-12 rifles in each aggregated guard detail and maybe 200-300 rounds of ammunition in each guardhouse. Other than that, all other weapons and ammunition are stored separately and drawing of arms and ammunition in times of need will take time.

As of now, we know nothing of the Gurkha Contingent’s weapons drawing protocol and ammunition storage and drawing protocol but there is reason to believe that their ammunition and weapons are stored in the same camp unlike the weapons and ammunition which are stored separately in all SAF units. Therefore, it is my belief that our SAF units cannot react fast enough to be mobilized, armed and ready for action if their was a mobilization call to neutralize the Gurkha Contingent when the need arises.

The red tape from the rules set by our leaders surrounding SAF weapons and ammunition drawing and the inherent fact that our Singaporean National Servicemen stay in the far flung corners of Singapore [with compliments from the Central Posting Centre in Mindef] as opposed to the Gurkhas being accommodated in their camp whilst on duty and being accommodated near their camp whilst off duty will prevent our local units  from reacting fast enough to tackle the mercenary unit should the mercenaries turn renegade.

[Please recall that in this incident, the SOC reacted fast enough to deploy to Mount Vernon Camp because it was merely an incident of scuffle and rioting. This situation would be vastly different from the scenario where it is the entire Gurkha Contingent co-operating to mutiny. There would be no 999 call to the Radio Division Singapore Police Force, there would also be no advance warning call to the Special Operations Command.]

The PAP had better come up with much better reasons for maintaining the need for the Gurkha Contingent.

Should the Gurkha Contingent revolt for reasons unknown, the PAP’s policy of recruiting and arming foreigners heavily on its own soil may prove to be the worst ever decision the administration has made and might in actual fact lead to the downfall of Singapore.

I repeat myself. Gurkhas are not Singaporeans, they are mercenaries and they intend to retire in their homeland when they finish their terms of services. Gurkhas are i believe more heavily armed, from what the photos reveal, with at least Heckler & Koch MP5 submachine guns and M-16 assault rifles as opposed to most of their Singaporean counterparts with their Smith & Wesson 0.38 revolvers. God knows whether or not they have the same heavy weapons as a SAF Infantry Battalion e.g. GPMGs.

Thank God that Singapore still has its Special Operations Command, Police Task Force unit, KINS and PINS. This however does not square the equation because do we have as many as 2000 fighting men in the Special Operations Command? I believe not.

The question is to MHA is this – What function does this unit perform which cannot be performed by true blue Singaporeans?

I hereby declare my intention to campaign for the disarming and disbanding of the Gurkha Contingent and I hope other Singaporeans will rally with me with this call.

Until the administration gets pressured enough to be accountable with how the Gurkhas’ recruitment, training, deployment and weapons access and cost of upkeep, I pray for all Singaporean police officers, especially those in the Special Operations Command, to keep a keen and watchful eye on the Gurkha Contingent for reasons which i need not say more.

No one need to look too far into history to know the dangers of having a foreign armed mercenary unit in Singapore.